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LATE-TWENTIETH -CENTURY ATHEISM 
Graham Oppy and Nick Trakakis 
In 1948, the BBC broadcast a debate between Bertrand Russell and Father 
Frederick Copleston on the existence of God (Russell & Copleston 1957). In that 
debate, Copleston claims: (i) that the existence of God can be proved by a meta-
physical argument from contingency; and (ii) that only the postulation of the 
existence of God can make sense of our religious and moral experience. Russell 
replies by giving diverse reasons for thinking that these two claims are incorrect: 
there are various ways in which Copleston's argument from contingency fails to be 
persuasive, and there are more plausible alternative explanations of our religious 
and moral experience. While there are many significant changes of detail, it is fair 
to say that the debate between Russell and Copleston typifies exchanges between 
theists and atheists in the second half of the twentieth century, and it is also fair to 
say that Russell's contribution to this debate typifies the approaches of late twen-
tieth-centuryatheists. l 
Speaking very roughly, we might divide the activities of atheists in the following 
way. First, some atheists have been concerned to argue that religious talk fails to 
be meaningful: there is no serious discussion to be had about, for example, the 
existence of God because one cannot even meaningfully deny the existence of 
God. Secondly, many atheists have been concerned to develop alternative world-
views to the kinds of worldviews that are presented in the world's religions; and, 
in particular, many atheists have been concerned to develop naturalistic world-
views that leave no room for any kinds of supernatural entities. Thirdly, some 
atheists have been interested in discussions of the ground rules for the arbitration 
of debates between theists and non -theists; and, in particular, some atheists have 
wanted to insist that there is an initial presumption in favour of atheism that leaves 
theistic opponents carrying the argumentative burden of proof. Fourthly, many 
1. A more recent (and more developed) version of a very similar debate can be found in 
Smart & Haldane (1996). 
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atheists have been concerned to raise objections against the plethora of theistic 
arguments that have been advanced, in particular on behalf of the claim that God 
exists. Fifthly, some atheists have also been concerned to advance argument on 
behalf of atheism and, in particular, on behalf of the claim that God does not 
exist. Sixthly, in the early part of the twenty-first century, some 'new' atheists have 
attempted to advance overarching critiques of religion - not merely theistic reli-
gion - in which even moderate religious belief is characterized as barbaric super-
stition. In what follows, we shall survey all of these different spheres of activity of 
atheists in the second half of the twentieth century.2 
Some philosophers have taken great pains to distinguish different varieties of 
non-belief, that is, different ways in which philosophers who do not accept the 
claim that God exists view that claim. While we can distinguish between 'weak 
agnosticism: 'strong agnosticism', 'weak atheism', 'strong atheism' and the like, for 
the purposes of the present chapter we shall just use the term 'atheism' to refer to 
all of those who are non-believers, that is, all of those who fail to accept the claim 
that God exists. Given this terminological stipulation, it follows that there are 
many atheists who are also religious believers: for what unites 'atheists' is merely 
their failure to accept the theistic hypothesis that God exists, and there are many 
religious traditions that fail to endorse the claim that God exists. 
ALLEGED PROBLEMS WITH RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE 
One of the perennial temptations in philosophy is the thought that we can describe 
boundaries to intelligible thought and intelligible utterance that place much philo-
sophical and religious thought and talk on the wrong side of that boundary. At 
the mid-point of the twentieth century, there were two powerful philosophical 
traditions -logical positivism and ordinary-language philosophy - that endorsed 
different ways of filling out this perennially tempting thought. The impact of those 
two traditions can be seen very clearly in the articles collected together in the 
influential anthology of Antony Flew and Alasdair Mcintyre (1955). 
On the logical positivist line of thought, the reason why religious claims are 
meaningless is that, while clearly not being mere truths of reason, those claims 
are insusceptible of empirical verification. The crude articulation of this line of 
thought by A. J. Ayer (1936) went on to receive further development in the work 
of such writers as John Wisdom (1944-5) and Flew (1961, 1984), and significant 
2. Although the focus in this chapter is on developments in the English-speaking analytic 
tradition, atheism has also had a strong presence in the so-called continental tradition, 
particularly in the atheistic stream of existentialism (the most Significant figure here being 
Jean-Paul Sartre, although Simone de Beauvoir, Albert Camus and Martin Heidegger are 
also often placed in this group). On the fortunes of atheism in more recent continental 
philosophy, in postmodern thought especially, see Caputo (2007). 
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elaboration of this type of approach can also be seen in the work of Kai Nielsen 
(1982) and Michael Martin (1990). While there has been strenuous criticisms of 
this line of thought from theistic philosophers - see, for example, Alvin Plantinga 
(1967,2000) - it is also worth noting that many atheistic philosophers have been 
prepared to reject the view that religious claims are literally meaningless (e.g. 
Mackie 1982; Sobel 2004). 
On the ordinary-language philosophy line of thought, the leading idea is that 
religious claims should be given some kind of non -cognitivist construal, that is, 
they should not be supposed to be in the business of stating facts. There are many 
different ways in which this fundamental idea might be further developed. On 
one way of thinking, religious assertions are expressive; for example, according 
to R. B. Braithwaite (1955), religious assertions are expressions of intentions to 
act in certain specified ways. On another way of thinking, the only standards to 
which religious claims are answerable are standards that are internal to religious 
language games: there is no single conception of 'the business of stating facts' 
to which common sense, science and religion are all answerable. Some philoso-
phers - for example D. Z. Phillips (1976) - have supposed that this latter way 
of thinking need not be uncongenial to religion; however, others - for example 
Stephen T. Davis (2001) - have supposed that the 'Wittgensteinian' way with reli-
gion amounts to the embrace of atheism. 
At the end of the twentieth century, there were still some atheistic philosophers 
inclined to the view that, for example, the claim that God exists is literally mean-
ingless. However, it seems safe to say that many more atheistic philosophers were 
inclined to follow the line taken by John Mackie and Jordan Howard Sobel, a line 
that leads to the search for evidence or reasons that bear on the assessment of the 
truth status of the claim that God exists. 
THE RISE OF NATURALISTIC PHILOSOPHY 
One of the major post-Second World War developments in philosophy has been 
the rise to prominence of naturalism and naturalistic philosophy. While naturalis-
tically inclined philosophers disagree about many matters, they characteristically 
agree that the natural world forms a causally closed system, and that there are no 
causal exchanges that do not form part of that causally closed system. Thus, natu-
ralistically inclined philosophers typically agree that there are no supernatural 
agents - no spooks, no gods, no ghosts, no unembodied minds or souls - because 
supernatural agency, by definition, requires causal interactions that form no part of 
that causally closed system that is the natural world. Among the matters on which 
naturalistically inclined philosophers disagree are such questions as whether all 
that exists belongs to the natural world; whether all that exists 'comes down' to 
elementary particles and microphysical events; and whether there is anything that 
resists explanation by the methods that are characteristic of the natural sciences. 
303 
GRAHAM OPPY AND NICK TRAKAKIS 
In many senses, W. V. Quine is the father of modern naturalistic philosophy. 
Quine held the view that everything that belongs to the natural world 'comes 
down' to elementary particles and microphysical events, but he allowed that there 
are things - numbers, functions, classes - that do not belong to the natural world. 
(Alas, Quine gave no very clear account of what it is for the natural world to 
'come down' to elementary particles and microphysical events, a question that has 
received much closer attention in more recent times.) Furthermore, Quine gave 
special prominence to the methods that are characteristic of the natural sciences in 
the project of describing and understanding the natural world. While it is perhaps 
not quite right to say that he denied that there is anything that resists explanation 
by the methods that are characteristic of the natural sciences, he was certainly 
inclined to insist on the use of the methods that are characteristic of the natural 
sciences in a diverse range of enquiries. In particular, Quine is very well known for 
his insistence that epistemology should be 'naturalized: that is, for his insistence 
that epistemology should be reconceived as a scientific study of the relationship, 
in human beings, between the inputs of sensory experience and the neural states 
that are prompted by those inputs. Moreover, Quine is also very well known for 
his insistence that, because the idioms that we typically use in making ascriptions 
of beliefs and desires resist smooth incorporation into a properly scientific world-
view, those idioms should be accorded only a second -class status, and should not 
be thought fit for the purposes of serious description and understanding of the 
world. (For a very brief outline of Quine's beliefs, see Quine [1966].) 
After Quine, naturalistic philosophy has developed in various directions. Some 
naturalists hold the thesis that everything in the natural world 'supervenes' on 
elementary particles and microphysical events, whereas other naturalists hold 
merely that everything in the natural world is 'constituted by' elementary parti-
cles and microphysical events. Some naturalists suppose that there are no such 
things as numbers, functions and classes; other naturalists suppose that numbers, 
functions and classes are denizens of the natural world; and yet other naturalists 
continue to agree with Quine that numbers, functions and classes exist, but not as 
parts of the natural world, and not in such a way as to be engaged in causal inter-
action with the natural world. Some naturalists suppose that it is indeed true that 
there is nothing that resists explanation by the methods that are characteristic of 
the natural sciences; but many naturalists suppose that, at the very least, there are 
many legitimate domains of enquiry that we can pursue only via the methods of 
enquiry of the social sciences, the humanities and so forth. 
Alongside the rise of naturalistic philosophy, there has been a parallel rise in 
naturalistic investigations of religious practices, customs and beliefs. While the 
project of arriving at a naturalistic explanation of religion was at least understood 
by David Hume (see Vol. 3, Ch. 19), and while various early attempts at naturalistic 
explanations of religion were enunciated during the nineteenth century, it is fair 
to say that the move to develop naturalistic explanations of religion really began 
to gather momentum towards the end of the twentieth century. In particular, the 
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close of the twentieth century saw the beginnings of some bold, interdisciplinary 
projects - drawing on anthropology, linguisticS, cognitive science, neuroscience, 
evolutionary theory and a range of other disciplines - that seek to provide satis-
factory naturalistic accounts of religion. Important examples of these types of 
projects include: Thomas Lawson and Robert McCauley (1990), Pascal Boyer 
(2001), Scott Atran (2002) and Daniel Dennett (2006). 
DEBATING THE BURDEN OF PROOF 
Some atheistic philosophers - including Flew (1976) and Michael Scriven (1966) 
- have argued that there is a 'burden of proof' on believers in the existence of God. 
In particular, these atheistic philosophers argue that the default position, adopted 
by all reasonable people in the absence of compelling arguments to the contrary, 
is either atheism or agnosticism. If theists cannot provide arguments that ought to 
persuade reasonable atheists to renounce their atheism and become theists then, 
on this line of thought, those theists are convicted of irrationality in their theistic 
beliefs. (Among subsequent writers, Martin [1990: 29] "remains neutral" on the 
question whether there is a presumption of atheism, but in a way that suggests 
some sympathy for the view that the 'burden of proof' rests with theists. Similarly, 
Keith Parsons [1989] suggests at least some sympathy for the view that the 'burden 
of proof' rests with theists.) 
Against these atheistic philosophers, other atheistic philosophers have thought 
that there is something improper in the legalistic invocation of the concept of 
'burden of proof' in the context of philosophical debate about the existence of 
God. Thus, for example, David Lewis (1993) ends with the observation that "some 
will want to play on by debating the burden of proof. Myself, I think that this 
pastime is as useless as it is undignified" (ibid.: 172). Furthermore, other atheistic 
philosophers have worried that there is a contlation of requirements on debate 
(argumentation) and requirements on belief at work in the suggestion that theists 
suffer under a 'burden of proof: While it seems right to think that doxastic respon-
sibility requires that believers have sufficiently good grounds for their beliefs, it is 
not at all clear how this requirement connects to the demand that believers have 
evidence that supports their beliefs, or to the demand that believers adduce accept-
able chains of reasoning that terminate in statements of the beliefs in question, or 
to the demand that believers find arguments that ought to persuade reasonable 
atheists to take on those theistic beliefs. 
RESPONDING TO THEISTIC ARGUMENTS 
During the heyday of logical positivism and ordinary-language philosophy, phil-
osophers typically took a very dismissive view of arguments for the existence 
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of God. Consider, for example, W T. Stace: "I simply cannot bear to discuss the 
dreary logomachy of the ontological argument. Probably Broad has completely 
demolished the argument. But I cannot bring myself to think that it needs demol-
ishing" (1959: 180). However, the last four decades of the twentieth century 
witnessed much interesting criticism of arguments for the existence of God on 
the part of atheistic philosophers of religion. Of course, this period also witnessed 
much interesting criticism of arguments for the existence of God on the part of 
theistic philosophers of religion. Thus, for example, Plantinga (1967) provides 
exemplary critiques of some of the best-known arguments for the existence of 
God. Nonetheless, much of the most interesting criticism of arguments for the 
existence of God in this period has come from the pens of atheistic philosophers. 
Some of this critical work is local, and consists in the detailed criticism of a 
particular argument or family of arguments, often within the compass of a single 
journal article or book chapter. Examples of this kind of critical work include: 
Lewis' (1970) discussion of Anselms ontological argument; William L. Rowe's 
(1975) discussion of cosmological arguments, including arguments from contin-
gency; Michael Tooley's (1981) discussion of Plantinga's ontological argument; 
Paul Draper's (1997) discussion of William Lane Craig's kalam cosmological argu-
ment; Alan Hajek's (2003) discussion of Pascal's wager; and Elliott Sober's (2003) 
discussion of the argument for design. 
Some of the interesting critical work has had a wider scope, and criticizes a 
wide range of arguments for the existence of God within the bounds of a single 
work. While there are earlier attempts to provide a synoptic discussion of argu-
ments about the existence of God - as, for example, in Wallace Matson's (1965) 
very readable, but somewhat flawed book - the first really significant book of this 
kind is Mackie (1982). In that work (The Miracle oj Theism), Mackie prOVides 
careful and incisive critiques of ontological arguments, cosmological arguments, 
arguments for design, arguments from consciousness, moral arguments and 
Pascalian wagers (in the service of constructing an overall case for the conclusion 
that there is no God). Other works constructed according to a similar plan, and 
covering much of the same range of arguments, include Martin (1990), Nicholas 
Everitt (2004) and Sobel (2004). Of works in this genre, Sobel's Logic and Theism 
established a new benchmark: although it has a more limited range than Mackie 
(1982), Sobel (2004) provides much more painstaking and detailed analyses of the 
arguments that it covers. 
Apart from books that attempt to provide overarching critiques of arguments 
for the existence of God, there are also some shorter works that aim to show that 
cases for the existence of God can be mimicked by equally good (or bad) cases for 
the existence of alternative deities, for example a perfectly evil God or a morally 
indifferent God. A nice example of this genre is provided by Christophe New 
(1993), who provides inversions of a large family of arguments for the existence of 
God, each of which purports to establish the existence of an omnipotent, omnis-
cient and maximally evil being. 
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ARGUING FOR ATHEISM 
Much of the most interesting recent work done by atheistic philosophers has 
focused on attempts to argue directly against the truth of theism (and directly 
for the truth of atheism). As in the case of responses to theistic arguments, some 
of this work has been local, focusing on particular kinds of considerations, while 
other instances of this kind of work have attempted to construct an overarching 
case for atheism (e.g. Matson 1965; Mackie 1982; Martin 1990; Le Poidevin 1996; 
Everitt 2004). 
J. N. Findlay (1948) attempts an ontological disproof of the existence of God. 
While this proof is not strong - among other things, it is vitiated by reliance on a 
conventionalist conception of necessity - it does point the way towards an inter-
esting global criticism of ontological arguments for the existence of God: in a 
large range of cases, ontological arguments for the existence of God can be 'paral-
leled' by arguments for the conclusion that God does not exist. Findlay himself 
quickly gave up on his ontological disproof; and perhaps there has been no subse-
quent atheist philosopher who has supposed that there are successful ontological 
disproofs of the existence of God. Nonetheless, many atheistic philosophers have 
supposed that most (if not all) ontological arguments for the existence of God are 
disabled by these 'parallel' arguments for the conclusion that God does not exist. 
Quentin Smith (1991) attempts a cosmological disproof of the existence of 
God, drawing on contemporary cosmological theorizing. In particular, Smith 
argues that there is some kind of inconsistency between big bang cosmology 
and theism. Given the fluid state of contemporary cosmological theorizing, it is 
unclear how much importance could be attributed to Smith's argument even if it 
were otherwise unexceptionable. And, in any case, there is much else in Smith's 
argument that has proven to be controversiaL Other atheist authors have hinted 
at different cosmological disproofs of the existence of God: there are arguments in 
William L. Rowe (1975) that suggest that considerations about contingency point 
strongly to the conclusion that God does not exist. Here, the idea is roughly this: if 
there is contingency, then there is brute, unexplained initial contingency. Theism 
is committed both to the claim that there is contingency - this is required by the 
assumption that we have libertarian freedom - and to the claim that there is no 
brute, unexplained initial contingency - this is required by the assumption that 
God provides a complete explanation for the existence and nature of the world 
even though there is no contingency in God. 
Wesley C. Salmon (1979) attempts a teleological disproof of the existence of 
God. Salmon's proof is elaborated into a whole battery of teleological disproofs 
in Martin (1990). The idea behind this style of disproof is that we have inductive 
evidence - based on universalliuman experience - that certain kinds of created 
entities are typically created by creators with certain kinds of properties. Given 
that the universe is an entity of the kind in question, we can infer that if it has a 
creator, then that creator has the properties in question: embodiment, fallibility, 
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finitude, being a worker with pre-existing materials, being one member of a crea-
tive team, and so forth. But a creator with these properties would not be the God 
of monotheistic religions. Everitt (2004) gives an argument from scale that runs 
along somewhat similar lines. Here, the motivating question is whether one would 
expect the God of traditional theism to create the kind of universe in which we 
actually live; and the line that Everitt takes is that more or less everything that 
modern science tells us about the size and scale and nature of the universe reveals 
that universe to be strikingly inapt as an expression of a set of divine intentions of 
the kind that is postulated by traditional theism. 
Perhaps predictably, many of the direct arguments that recent atheistic phil-
osophers have launched against theism have involved considerations about evil. 
Mackie (1955) launched an intensive investigation oflogical arguments from evil: 
of arguments that purport to show that there is a logical inconsistency between 
the claim that God exists and some well-established claim about evil (e.g. that 
there is evil in the world, or that there is moral evil in the world, or that there is 
horrendous evil in the world, or the like). While many theists suppose that these 
kinds of arguments are defeated by the free will defence elaborated by Plantinga 
(1965), there are some atheist philosophers who continue to pursue and defend 
logical arguments from evil (see e.g. Gale 1991). 
Rowe (1979) provoked a similarly intensive investigation of evidential argu-
ments from evil: of arguments that purport to show that the claim that God exists is 
implausible, or improbable, or not worthy of belief, in the light of certain evidence 
about the nature and extent of kinds of evil in our universe. On Rowe's account, 
it is highly improbable that particular instances of the suffering of animals and 
young children would be permitted by an all-powerful, all-knowing and perfectly 
good God. While some theists have maintained that Rowe's evidential argument 
from evil is in no better shape than Mackie's logical argument from evil - see, for 
example, the theistic contributions to Daniel Howard-Snyder (1996) - there are 
many atheist philosophers who continue to think that Rowe's evidential argument 
from evil does embody powerful grounds for atheism. 
Draper (1989) presents another kind of evidential argument from evil. On 
Draper's account, there is good prima facie reason to reject theism deriving from 
the negative evidential impact on theism of the observations that we make, and 
the testimony that we encounter, concerning human and animal experiences of 
pain and pleasure. (The observations that we make, and the testimony that we 
encounter, concerning human and animal experiences of pain and pleasure, are 
much more likely on the hypothesis that neither the nature nor the condition of 
sentient beings on earth is the result of benevolent or malevolent actions performed 
by non-human persons, than they are on the hypothesis that the nature and condi-
tion of sentient beings on earth is the result of the actions of an omnipotent, omnis-
cient and perfectly good God.) Draper's argument has occasioned a considerable 
amount of critical discussion from theistic philosophers such as Plantinga and 
Howard-Snyder; it seems doubtful that this discussion has yet been exhausted. 
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There are other arguments that atheists have mounted against theism that are 
not strictly speaking arguments from evil, but which are arguments in the same 
ballpark. So, for example, John Schellenberg (1993) mounts a sustained argument 
against the existence of God on the grounds of divine hiddenness: if there were 
an omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good God, surely there would be much 
better evidence available to all of the existence of such a being. Similarly, Theodore 
Drange (1998) mounts an argument against the existence of God on the grounds of 
non-belief: if there were an omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good God, surely 
there would not be so many reasonable, intelligent and well-informed people who 
fail to believe that God exists. The arguments of Schellenberg and Drange have 
both been widely discussed; see, for example, Howard -Snyder and Paul Moser 
(2002), for a selection of critical responses to Schellenberg's argument. 
Apart from logical arguments from evil, there are other arguments that purport 
to raise logical difficulties for theism. Mackie (1955) also initiated contemporary 
debate about the paradoxes of omnipotence: what should a theist say in response 
to the question whether God can make a stone so heavy that God is unable to 
lift that stone? (On the one hand, if God cannot make such a stone, then there is 
something God cannot do, and so God is not omnipotent. On the other hand, if 
God can make such a stone, then there is something that God cannot do, namely, 
lift the stone that God is able to make.) While this simple version of the paradox 
of omnipotence seems easily met - not even God can be expected to do that 
which is logically impossible, and at least one half of the dilemma prompted by 
our question implicitly requires God to do something that is logically impossible 
- discussion of more complex versions of this argument has continued into the 
twenty-first century. 
Patrick Grim (1983) is the first of a series of papers that develops arguments for 
the conclusion that it is impossible for there to be an omniscient being. According 
to Grim, the very notion of omniscience is beset by logical paradox: there is no 
collection of truths that could form the object of knowledge of an omniscient 
being; and, besides, there are perspective-dependent truths that can be grasped 
only from perspectives other than the one that would be occupied by God (if 
there were such a being). While Grim has pursued his arguments in debate with 
numerous theistic opponents - including, notably, Plantinga (see Plantinga & 
Grim 1993) - it is probably fair to say that his arguments have not found as much 
support as the corresponding arguments that have been developed in connection 
with the notion of divine omnipotence. 
Of course, there are many other arguments that are taken to raise logical prob-
lems for theism. There are questions about divine foreknowledge and human 
freedom; see John Martin Fischer (1994) for contributions by some contemporary 
atheists to this debate. There are questions about divine freedom; Rowe (2004) 
marks one recent attempt to argue that an omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly 
good being could not have the kind of freedom that is required for moral respon-
sibility' praise and gratitude. There are also many questions about less commonly 
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discussed divine attributes, and particular theological doctrines. So, to take a 
small number of examples among many: Richard M. Gale (1991) argues for the 
claim that the doctrine of divine simplicity is incoherent; Martin (1997) argues 
that there are many logical difficulties in the traditional theistic conception of 
heaven; and Lewis (1997) argues that the doctrine of the atonement is not worthy 
of belief. One of the interesting developments in analytic philosophy of religion 
in the latter part of the twentieth century has been the wider range of topics that 
have been investigated using the tools of analytical philosophy: this broadening 
of range has been true of atheistically motivated philosophers no less than it has 
been true of theistically motivated philosophers. 
THE 'NEW' ATHEISM 
The beginning of the new millennium has witnessed a perhaps unexpected surge 
in public enthusiasm for books that take a highly critical view of theism, and of 
religion in general. Works by the 'new atheists' - Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, 
Christopher Hitchens, Michel Onfrey, Anthony Grayling, Daniel Dennett, and 
others - have found a large global audience, often occupying prominent positions 
in bestseller lists. 
The works of these 'new atheists' have been written against the background of 
broader changes in attitudes towards religion and religious belief over the course 
of the second half of the twentieth century. Census figures across the Western 
world indicate that, for much of the latter half of the twentieth century, organized 
religion was in something approaching decline. While there was some increase in 
the number of those claiming to have no religion, there was much greater increase 
in the number of those who claimed to belong to no organized religion. Church 
numbers maintained a steady downwards slide; and the percentage of people who 
attended church only very infrequently continued to increase. 
Of course, these general trends were not uniform. Moreover, and more impor-
tantly, even while the overall trends indicated that organized religion was in 
decline, these trends were not necessarily replicated in the fortunes of the evan-
gelical branches of at least some of the major religions. In particular, in the United 
States, the last part of the twentieth century witnessed strong gains for evangelical 
Christianity, especially in the so-called 'red' states. As evangelical Christians came 
to have more influence on the Republican party and its policies, the influence 
of evangelical Christian beliefs could be discerned in a diverse range of social 
trends: a greater push for evangelical Christian home schooling (and schooling 
outside the public education system); more intense evangelical Christian oppos-
ition to legal recognition of gay relationships and other legal entitlements for gay 
couples; greatly increased evangelical Christian support for equal recognition of 
the theory of intelligent design in public school biology classes; massive diversion 
of public funds from secular social service organizations to evangelical Christian 
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organizations under the label of 'faith-based initiatives'; increased evangelical 
Christian promotion of 'abstinence only' sex education programmes in public 
schools; and so on across the full range of evangelical Christian activity. 
In other parts of the world, the latter part of the twentieth century witnessed 
gains for evangelical branches of other major world religions. In particular, evan-
gelical Islam made considerable gains in many corners of the globe - in the 
Middle East, Africa and Asia - and there were also some gains for evangelical 
Hinduism, most notably in India. And, along with the rise of support for evan-
gelical forms of several of the major world religions, there has also been a rise in 
political and social tensions - and, in many cases, political and social violence 
- in which matters of evangelical religious disagreement have played some kind 
of role. While the causal aetiology is unclear, it is uncontroversial that evangel-
ical religion is one of the causal factors involved in, for example, the rise of Al 
Qaeda, the 9/11 attacks, suicide bombings in the Middle East and skirmishes on 
the India/Pakistan border. 
Writers such as Harris (2005, 2006), Hitchens (2007) and Dawkins (2006) 
argue, not only that the recent rise of evangelical religion marks a serious slide 
back towards a dark and barbarous past, but that even religious moderation 
marks a set of irresponsible cultural and intellectual accommodations with a 
best-rejected ancient heritage. In their view, teaching the beliefs of evangelical 
religionists to children is tantamount to child abuse; and, in general, "religious 
faith represents so uncompromising a misuse of the power of our minds that it 
forms a kind of perverse cultural Singularity - a vanishing point beyond which 
rational discourse proves impossible" (Harris 2005: 25). Critics of the 'new athe-
ists' have not been slow to wonder at the sheer magnitude of the assertions that 
the 'new atheists' make: in claiming that even religious moderates are irrational 
in their religious beliefs, the 'new atheists' commit themselves to the view that 
more than 90 per cent of all the adults on the planet have simply irrational reli-
gious beliefs. 
While it certainly should not be supposed that all atheists are enthusiastic 
supporters of the 'new atheists: it seems plausible to suppose that the 'new atheism' 
will occupy a prominent position in academic debates about religion and religious 
belief in the immediate future. Indeed, because - at least in the area of philosophy 
- evangelical Christians have made considerable inroads into the academy (partic-
ularly, but not only, in the United States), one expects that arguments involving 
the 'new atheists' will grow even noisier in the coming years. 
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